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a b s t r a c t
Battery-powered unmanned aerial vehicle based video sensing system is more cost-saving and energy-
saving than traditional aircraft based systems. However, high-volume real-time sensing data is more
vulnerable in unmanned system than that in manned system. Meanwhile, the computation and energy
resources in such system are very limited, which restricts the use of complex encryption process on
video data. Therefore, how to achieve conﬁdentiality of video data under limited resources efﬁciently
needs to be addressed. Firstly, resources constraints with their development trends in video sensing
system are studied. Secondly, an information-utility-value-oriented resource-efﬁcient encryption opti-
mization model under resources constraints is given. Thirdly, based on this model, a video-compression-
independent speed-adjustable lightweight encryption scheme with its improved version is proposed.
Fourthly, a DSP and ARM based embedded secure video sensing system is designed, and the proposed
encryption scheme has been implemented in it. In addition, theoretical analyses based on information
theory and experimental analyses on throughputs show that the proposed encryption schemes can meet
the real-time requirements of system under the tight resources constraints.




In recent years, applications of Internet of Things (IoT) have
drawn wide attention from both academia and industry. Multi-
media sensing is one of the important IoT applications (Atzori
et al., 2010). Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) based video sensing
system is a new class of multimedia sensing. The battery-powered
unmanned system can largely reduce the operational risks and be
more energy-saving than video sensing system based on tradi-
tional aircraft.
Nevertheless, the information technology has always been
haunted by information security problem. And this problem is
more serious in network times. Consequently, the IoT applications,
which are based on network communication technology, inherit
the security problem naturally. So the security issue becomes a
central concern which may hamper the development of IOT
technology and has attracted widespread attentions (Granjal
et al., 2015; Almalkawi et al., 2010). As for UAV-based video
sensing, since there is no pilot in the aerial vehicle, the aircraft is
easily captured by attackers, which makes the airborne data more
vulnerable. However, protecting real-time big multimedia sensing
data needs complex encryption operation. For battery-powered
sensor devices, when compared with general non-battery-
powered IoT equipments, the limited computation and energy
resources further restrict the protection of data security. Then
these limitation make the security issue of multimedia data with
resources constraints more troublesome (Ning and Liu, 2012; Chen
et al., 2009; Min, 2014).
1.2. Related works on video encryption
To solve the problem of high-volume multimedia data protec-
tion, optimized encryption schemes for audio/video data have
been researched (Lian et al., 2009; Singh and Manimegalai, 2012).
As to our application scenario, that is considering different steps of
video compression where encryption process is introduced, those
schemes could be generally divided into the following two classes.
The ﬁrst class can be called partial encryption or selective
encryption in general. The main idea of this class is taking
advantage of the characters of compressed video, and using the
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traditional encryption algorithm to encrypt a selected crucial
subset of the video data after or in a certain step of the video
compression. Although the left data, except the selected crucial
subset, is transmitted in plaintext and could be wiretapped by
attackers, the missing selected subset makes attackers hard to
rebuild a discernible video.
The ﬁrst class can then be divided into two subclasses. In the
ﬁrst subclass, some typical algorithms only encrypt the I-frames of
video (Maples and Spanos, 1995). In these algorithms about one
third of the total data needs to be encrypted (Agi and Gong, 1996).
Despite the P-frames and B-frames are transmitted in clear, and
could be eavesdropped by attackers, it is very hard to rebuild a
clear A/V without the I-frames.
Another subclass is designed based on the ﬁrst subclass. This
subclass is generally called joint compression encryption
scheme (Singh and Manimegalai, 2012; Mallika and Sivakumar.
2014; Nidhi et al., 2014). Compared with the ﬁrst one, the main idea
of this subclass is applying the encryption in a certain processing
step of the video compression algorithms, while dividing the
encrypted subsets into smaller segments. For example, those
schemes always encrypt DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) coefﬁ-
cients, MV(Motion Vector) and other parameters in video encoding.
As to the ﬁrst subclass, the experimental analysis given in (Agi
and Gong, 1996) shows that without the crucial subset, using the
scheme (Maples and Spanos, 1995) where only I-frames are
encrypted as an example, attackers may also get a video with a
decreased quality. That is because the unencrypted I-blocks in P-
frames and B-frames can be decoded fully. Albeit these data lose
commercial values after encrypted by such schemes, part of the
video can be rebuilt and understood. So those schemes are not
secure enough for some conﬁdential applications. An improved
scheme is proposed by Meyer and Gadegast (1995), where 4 levels
of security are implemented. One important level is to encrypt all
the I-frames and I-blocks in both P and B frames. Such scheme
increases the security of the encrypted data, but lowers the
encryption speed and information leakage still cannot be totally
avoid (Agi and Gong, 1996).
Compared to the ﬁrst subclass of schemes, the second subclass
schemes are faster. However, since the encryption rate is relatively
small, their security is comparatively low (Lian et al., 2009; L. Qiao
and Nahrstedt, 1998, 1997). To be speciﬁc, as to the security
requirement of application discussed in this paper, just by low-
ering the qualities of the videos to protect the commercial value of
data is not secure enough. Because the information such as
contours and movements of the main objects of the videos are
all needed to be protected. Under this circumstance, the ﬁrst class
is hard to be qualiﬁed. In addition, since those schemes need to
combine with video compression processes, as to modularized
video capture devices whose video compressions have already
been implemented in hardwares, joint compression schemes are
hard to integrate with such devices.
Although the joint compression encryption schemes have some
security problems, as they have a high encryption speed, they are
convenient to be used in commercial or recreational applications
to protect the data by reducing the qualities of videos.
The second class is developed from traditional full encryptions,
which is commonly called improved full encryption. The scheme
presented by Qiao and Nahrstedt (1997) is a representative one. It
is a simpliﬁed full encryption which is similar to each iterative
operation of DES encryption algorithm. In one iterative step of DES
algorithm, 64 bit input plaintext is divided into two parts: 32 bit
Li1 and 32 bit Ri1, and let output Li¼Ri1 and Ri¼Li1F(Ri1,
Ki), where F is a permutation function, and Ki is a key.
Qiao and Nahrstedt (1997) ﬁrstly analyzed the statistical char-
acter of compressed video data. The analysis results show that the
data have high randomness at the byte level because of the use of
variable-length Huffman codes and other processes in the video
compression. Based on this statistical character of compressed
video, Video Encryption Algorithm (VEA) is proposed. The main
idea of VEA scheme is as follows: (1) divides the plaintext block into
2 subblocks: Even and Odd parts, (2) encrypts the Odd part with a
standard encryption algorithm E to get a half of the ciphertext E
(Odd), (3) exclusive-OR-eds ( or Xor) Even and Odd parts to get
another half C, where C¼Odd Even. Therefore, the ﬁnal ciphertext
is the integration of C and E(Odd). This mechanism can reduce the
encryption complexity to 53% of that of the used standard full
encryption algorithm E, and achieve a sufﬁcient security level.
Tosun and Feng (2000) further extended this scheme. They bisected
the odd parts, and only encrypt one fourth of the plaintext. This
scheme reduced the encryption complexity to about one fourth of
standard full encryption algorithm E.
Compared with the ﬁrst class, such schemes can encrypt all
kinds of compressed data. However, since its encryption rate is
ﬁxed, the improvements of encryption speeds of these schemes
are limited.
The two previous classes of optimized encryption schemes
always focus on the real-time character rather than the optimiza-
tion of the use of limited resources (Lian et al., 2009; Liu and
Koenig, 2014; Liu and Koenig, 2010). Besides, Massoudi et al.
(2008) points out that those schemes use static encryption
parameters and rates of encrypted parts. Such designs make the
throughputs of those schemes could not adjust dynamically to
meet the ﬂuctuated throughputs of media data in real-time
systems.
In addition, few schemes are video-compression-independent,
and each of those schemes focuses on one or a few speciﬁc video
compression standards. Above reasons limit their use in video
sensing systems with resources constraints, in which bandwidth of
video data ﬂuctuates dramatically (Liu and Koenig, 2014; Heer
et al., 2011; Hu and Chen, 2012). A resource-efﬁcient, video-
compression-independent, throughput-adjustable encryption
scheme which can achieve an acceptable video security under
tight resources constraints is sorely expected.
1.3. Security analyses of video encryption
Then we analyze the security of multimedia encryption
schemes based on Shannon information theory (Shannon and
Weaver, 1949; Weaver, 1949; Guiasu, 1977). The variables we used
are shown as following: (1) a random multimedia object is
denoted as M; (2) traditional Shannon entropy is denoted as H
(M); (3) conditional entropy, which is the uncertainty of M under
the condition of known Z, is denoted as H(M|Z); (4) mutual
information, which is the amount of information about informa-
tion source X after Y is known, is denoted as I(X;Y). As to general-
ized information, (5) generalized information entropy of
multimedia event M is denoted as Hn(M); (6) generalized informa-
tion conditional entropy is denoted as Hn(M|Z); (7) generalized
mutual information is denoted as In(X;Y). Let FEi(M) be the
encryption output after M is encrypted by full encryption algo-
rithm FEi. According to classical information theory, we can get H
(M|FEi(M))¼H(M), and then I(X;Y)¼H(M)–H(M|FEi(M))¼0.
Very few researches discuss the theoretical security of multi-
media encryptions. As far as we know only (Gibson et al., 2004)
analyses the security of its selective encryption of scalable speech
coding based on Shannon theory. They use X\widehat to indicate
core layer information, and use X\widehat2 to indicate enhancement
layer information. Then the uncertainty of X\widehat given
X\widehat2 can be denoted as H(X\widehat|X\widehat2 ). They draw the
conclusion that H(X\widehat|X\widehat2 )¼H(X\widehat), or equivalently,
mutual information I(X\widehat:X\widehat2 )¼H(X\widehat|X\widehat2 )–H
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(X\widehat)¼0. Thus they hold that even though the enhancement
layer is sent in-the-clear, the eavesdropper gains no advantages.
The problem of the analysis is that whether the plaintext subset
X\widehat2 contains no information about X\widehat that would be
encrypted, namely whether I(X\widehat: X\widehat2 )¼0, is not impor-
tant. Nonetheless, the most important issue is whether unen-
crypted X\widehat2 contains information of the video which needs
protection, i.e. whether In(M; X\widehat2 )¼H(M)–H(M|X\widehat2 ) equals
to 0 is very important. For example, as to the typical selective
encryption scheme, I-frames in the video are encrypted, but P-
frames and B-frames are not encrypted. Even P and B-frames
(considered as X\widehat2 ) do not contain the information of I-
frames (considered as X\widehat), i.e. I(X\widehat: X\widehat2 )¼0, P and
B-frames do have a large amount of information of video. (Agi and
Gong, 1996) analyzed and attacked the videos encrypted by
scheme (Maples and Spanos, 1995), and gave images of some
decompressed frames. As shown in the images of their paper,
contours of the main objects of videos could be rebuilt and be
understood by attackers. As to conﬁdential applications rather than
commercial ones, contours and movements of the main objects
actually have a higher value to attackers.
In selective or partial encryption, the most ideal solution is to
ﬁnd an independent data subset (X\widehat2 ) that contains few
information of the video (i.e. In(M; X\widehat2 ) would be close to
0,) and can be transmitted in plaintext. But it is almost impossible
for most multimedia compression standards to get the ideal
solution. However, even such subset X\widehat2 can be found, if the
data volume is not big enough, i.e. the encrypted partM-X\widehat2 is
not small enough, the improvement of the encryption speed is
limited. On the other side, if we wish that M-X\widehat2 is small
enough, encryption must be engaged during compression process
to encrypt some subsets of data, which will lead to non-
universality of encryption schemes. So there will be a tradeoff
between high speed and video-compression-independent.
Compared with the ﬁrst class of schemes, the improved full
encryption does not have data which is sent in clear. Our proposed
scheme also belongs to this class. Its security will be discussed in
Section 4.4.
In this paper, we ﬁrstly analyze the application scenario and the
variation trends of encryption resources constraints, then put
forward a encryption optimization model, based on which we
also proposed an encryption scheme aiming at the application
mentioned before. Moreover, the efﬁciency of the proposed
scheme is analyzed in the embedded prototype system we
constructed.
2. Resources constraints with their variation trends in video
sensing system
2.1. Application scenario and its resources constraints
Application scenario considered in this paper is a video sensing
system based on a battery-powered multi-rotor Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) we designed, which is shown in Fig. 1 Since there
are security requirements in this video system, the sensing data
should be stored conﬁdentially to avoid being wiretapped. In
addition, an extended function in this system is sending snapshots
of video to remote controller in wireless channel. This snapshot
data should also be sent conﬁdentially.
Protecting the security of aforementioned data involves com-
plicated data encryption operations. To analyze the throughput of
traditional encryption schemes, 3DES algorithm programed in
Cþþ is tested in the embedded prototype system implemented
in Section 5. Without any other heavy-load processes, its through-
put is about 8 Mbps, which could not undertake the real-time task
that encrypting only one stream of higher-quality video data (e.g.
1080p video with a code rate of 10 Mbps).
2.2. The non-convergence of discrepancy between data volume and
limited resources
As to battery-powered equipments, the resources constraints
which limit the data protection include not only computation but
also energy resources. However, the growth of data volume over-
whelms the growth of encryption resources, and this problem is
non-convergent. That is because, ﬁrstly, the growth of encryption
throughput is highly correlated with the growth of the CPU speed.
Even if Moore's Law is not failed, the performance of chips
continually doubles every 18 months, or grows about 60 percent
per year. Comparatively, the disk density doubles every year (Gray
and Patterson, 2003), which overwhelms the increase of computer
performance. Secondly, the data volume of multimedia data, the
image process ability and the bandwidth of core network grow
even faster than disk densities. In addition, the computation and
encryption capabilities of battery-powered equipments are also
constrained by battery capacity. And the battery capacity grows
more slowly. A conclusion could be drawn that the resources
constraints will continue to affect the data security of multimedia
sensing systems adversely, and this problem will not converge.
Therefore, a resource-efﬁcient model for data encryption optimi-
zation is very necessary.
3. Information-utility-value-oriented resource-efﬁcient
encryption optimization model
3.1. Speciﬁcity of protection for multimedia data
Optimization of resources distribution should take video data
characters into consideration. When the data encryption process
has no time limitation and the encryption resource is adequate
enough, like protecting text data in usual systems, traditional full
encryption schemes are appropriate. In this case, the full encryp-
tion allocated the sufﬁcient encryption resource into all symbols in
the plaintext averagely, where distribution of information value is
relatively even, and can provide unconditional security (Norman
and Landgrave, 1997). However, the distribution of information
value in compressed multimedia data is not evenly distributed.
In addition, the same video in different application scenarios
has different values. Moreover, as to video sensing, encryption
resources are insufﬁcient in long terms, as discussed in Section 2.
Hence, unconditional security is impossible, and the traditional
full encryption schemes are unsuitable and wasteful.
However, previous studies on multimedia encryption schemes
always focused on the real-time issue, and the encryption cost of
energy and other resources are relatively disregarded. In addition,
few studies offer a formalized encryption optimization model
under a consideration of resource efﬁciency.
In this section, ﬁrstly, a formalized model for analyzing the
security of generalized information for multimedia data isFig. 1. UAV based video sensing system.
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constructed; secondly, the impacts of encryption optimization on
attacker's behavior are discussed; thirdly, an information-utility-
value-oriented encryption optimization model for multimedia
data is proposed.
3.2. Security of generalized information for multimedia data
We ﬁrstly analyze the security of multimedia data based on
generalized information. Due to the characteristic of multimedia
compression coding, the length of compressed data is positively
correlated to the complexity of original multimedia information.
There could be some valuable information beyond all the bits of
the original information. For example, in some sensitive applica-
tions, the complexity of original multimedia data reﬂected by the
length of compressed data can also expose some multimedia
pragmatic information to attackers. However, there is no such
problem for original uncompressed video. That is because the
original video data with same time lengths have same volumes
As to generalized information of video mentioned above, their
security sometimes could not be protected by traditional encryp-
tion schemes. According to the concept of generalized information
given in Section 1, there could be generalized mutual information
beyond all the bits of the original information, the generalized
mutual information of FEi(M) and M, denoted as In(M;FEi(M)) is
greater than 0. Therefore, using traditional encryption schemes is
not a sufﬁcient condition for generalized information security of
multimedia data. As to the example given above, some tail ﬁlling
schemes could be used to protect the information of the complex-
ity of the videos, which can be gotten from the length of the
compressed video.
Meanwhile, previous studies on multimedia encryption (Liu
and Koenig, 2014; Lian et al., 2009) point out that some encryption
schemes could achieve an acceptable security level by encrypting
some selected crucial subsets of the video data.
LetMESi denote a selected multimedia encryption scheme, then
MESi(M) is the ciphertext, or in other words, encryption output of
multimedia data M encrypted by MESi.
Let us assume that MESi has a constant encryption ratio Rate
(MESi), where function Rate() represents the ratio between the
encryption resources cost ofMESi and full encryption. Thus, we can
get the following expression:
(MESiðInðM;MESi Mð ÞÞ=Hn Mð Þo1Rate MESið ÞÞ: ð1Þ
Therefore, full encryption is neither a necessary nor a sufﬁcient
condition for generalized information security of multimedia data.
It is necessary to build a formalized model to discuss the costs and
beneﬁts of multimedia encryption processes.
Guiasu (1977) is an earlier literature putting forward the
concept of utility value of information. Zhong (1998) suggests that
utility value and pragmatic of information have a similar implica-
tion. Furthermore, we believe the utility value of data is related
with application scenarios. We use v(M, Scenario) to show the
utility value of multimedia data M in a speciﬁc application
scenario which is denoted as Scenario.
3.3. Information-utility-value-oriented security optimization based
on attacker behavior analysis
We use valueLeak (M, MESi, Scenario, Cost) to denote the
maximum utility value of information that could be stolen from
MESi(M) by an attacker with total resources cost Cost. Here
MESi(M) is the ciphertext of M encrypted by MESi. The costs spent
by attacker include the time, money, computational resources,
electric energy of unplugged equipments and other limited
resources. According to the deﬁnition of generalized mutual
information, we have valueLeak (M,MESi, Scenario, Cost)o¼ In(M;
MESi(M)).
As for those legitimate users who have the key of MESi, they
need just the normal decryption cost DecryptionCost to get the
original multimedia data M. At this time, valueLeak (M, MESi,
“UserHaveKey”, DecryptionCost)¼v(M, Scenario). As for those
attackers who have unlimited resources, valueLeak (M, MESi,
Attacker,1)¼v(In(M; MESi (M)), Scenario).
If we focus on the relationship of function value valueLeak() and
costs of attackers Cost in a given condition where the type of
multimedia data M, multimedia encryption scheme MESi, and
Scenario are ﬁxed, we can regard the leaked value as a unary
function of Cost: valueLeaknMESi(Cost), where valueLeaknMESi(Cost)¼
valueLeak (M,MESi, Scenarios, Cost). And the function satisﬁes
following properties:
0rvalueLeaknMESi Costð Þrv M; Scenariosð Þ: ð2Þ
And ﬁrst derivative of function should satisfy the following
expression:
valueLeaknMESi0 Costð ÞZ0: ð3Þ
Since the costs that attackers are willing to spend in different
application scenarios are dramatically different, in the following
analysis, behaviors of attackers are discussed under two applica-
tion scenarios: (1) commercial or entertainment applications and
(2) conﬁdential applications.
3.3.1. Impacts of encryption scheme optimization on attacker's utility
value beneﬁt under CCS
In commercial application, requirement for data security is
always Conditional Computational Security (CCS) (Norman and
Landgrave, 1997). CCS requires that the costs of attackers should be
greater than the value of information they can steal.
On the contrary, as for attackers, they wish the value of
information they stole to be larger than their costs. In general, if
a commercial system satisﬁes CCS, the higher costs may prevent
attackers' attacks. So the constrain expression of the attackers
could be expressed as follows:




As is shown in Fig. 2(a), the vertical axis represents the utility
value of multimedia information, the horizontal axis represents
the resources cost of attackers. The red straight line represents the
V¼Cost, and the area of region shaded with red vertical lines on
the upper left indicates the feasible region where the constraint of
VZCost is satisﬁed.
Let us assume that the blue curve represents the function of
valueLeaknMESi(Cost), and the region shaded with horizontal lines on
the lower right part denotes the probable proﬁts could be obtained
by attackers. Hence, in Fig. 2(a), only the overlap region colored
with green satisﬁes the constraint in expression Eq. (4). Point e is
the intersection point of straight line and curve mentioned above.
Ordinate of e is the maximum utility value could be obtained by
attackers.
According to the application scenarios and resources con-
straints, multimedia system designers should improve the encryp-
tion scheme to minimize the utility value of information gained by
attackers.
As is shown in Fig. 2(b), with the improvement of encryption
scheme, the blue curve will move closer to horizontal axis. Then the
intersection point of the blue curve and the red straight line will
move from e1 to e2, then e3, and attackers will get less information,
which may make the attackers give up attacking. For example,
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when intersection point e3 overlaps with the origin point, attackers
will not get utility value of multimedia data larger than their costs.
3.3.2. Impacts of encryption scheme optimization on attacker's
utility value beneﬁt under CS.
Compared with it of commercial applications, value of multi-
media information in conﬁdential applications might be higher.
Consequently, attackers may even put forth their best effort to
attack without considering resource costs. In this occasion, we wish
a higher security level Computational Security (CS) (Norman and
Landgrave, 1997) could be satisﬁed. Compared with CCS, CS requires
that the system could not be broken by attackers in an acceptable
time with all best resources available. However, since resources in
battery-powered embedded systems are limited, CS is too expen-
sive to be achieved. A compromised scheme is to minimize the
utility value of information which could be stolen by attackers.
We can treat CS as CCS with unlimited value of data. In this
case, attackers will cost maximum probable resources, denoted as
Costn, to attack the system. And the new constrain expression of
the attackers could be expressed as follows:




As is shown in Fig. 2(c), the region shaded with red vertical
lines on the left indicates the feasible region where the constraint
that CostrCostn is satisﬁed. And the region shaded with blue
horizontal lines on the lower right part denotes the feasible proﬁts
which could be obtained by attackers. The overlap region colored
with green satisﬁes the constraint in expression Eq. (5). Ordinate
of intersection point e is the maximum utility value could be
obtained by attackers.
Like that in Fig. 2(b), with the improvement of encryption
scheme, the blue curve in Fig. 2(c) will also move closer to
horizontal axis. Then the intersection point will move from e1 to
e2, then e3, and attackers will get less information. In the most
optimistic case, the blue curve could overlap with the horizontal
axis, and attackers will not get any utility value.
It can be seen that improvements of the encryption schemes can
prevent attackers' attacks. But improvements are always achieved
at the cost of computation and energy resources. So a resources-
effective encryption optimization model is very necessary.
3.4. Information-utility-value-oriented encryption optimization
model for multimedia data under resources constraints
In this subsection, an Information-utility-value-oriented Encry-
ption Optimization (IEO) model is proposed. The optimization
Fig. 2. Information-utility-value-oriented attacker behavior analysis. (a) Information-utility-value-oriented cost-beneﬁt analysis of attacker under CCS, (b) impacts of
encryption scheme optimization on attacker's utility value beneﬁt under CCS and (c) impacts of encryption scheme optimization on attacker's utility value beneﬁt under CS.
(For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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principle of this model is to select appropriate subset of data and
encryption schemes to minimize the utility value which could be
stolen by attackers, under both the real-time constraint and
limited resources constraints of application. We use the following
optimization expression to construct the optimization model:
min :valueLeakðM;MESi; Scenario;CastnÞ
s:t: 1ð Þrealtime constraint;
2ð Þlimited resources constraints:
8><
>: ð6Þ
The decision variable of the above optimization model is MESi. In
this model,M could be a set of target multimedia data, andMESi could
be a set of corresponding multimedia encryption schemes. WhenM is
a single stream of data, MESi means a speciﬁc multimedia encryption
scheme. Comparatively, when M includes several streams of data,
MESi means a whole optimization plan including the selection of
encryption algorithms and selection of streams to be encrypted.
It should determine the optimum encryption algorithm for
each stream in the system, and let the used encryption resources
be concentrated on the streams with higher security weightiness.
In addition, application scenario Scenario also needs to be con-
sidered in the optimization.
4. Resource-efﬁcient speed-adjustable fast multimedia
encryption scheme
4.1. Application-oriented encryption optimizing strategy
According to the IEO model given in Section 3, optimization of
encryption scheme should ﬁrstly take application scenario into
consideration. In addition, information utility value got by attack-
ers should be minimized under the resources constraints.
Therefore, under the application environment of our research,
the following requirements should be taken into full account in
the encryption scheme we study.
1) Although the camera used in the prototype system only has a
resolution of 1280n720. With the increasingly extensive usage
of 4K (4096n2160) pixels camera and multi-camera, the
volume of big video sensing data grows very fast. At the
meantime, because the embedded video system and the aerial
vehicle share the limited battery, the discrepancy between the
massive video data and the limited resources is very serious,
and the encryption scheme should be designed as light as
possible.
2) When sensing system is applied in some sensitive scenario,
there might be some puissant attackers who will make analy-
tical attacks on the data. Simple partial encryption algorithms
would probably make part of the video information leaked (Agi
and Gong, 1996). Then attackers might get important informa-
tion from the unencrypted part and rebuild a discernible video
with decreased quality. In this time, valueLeak (M, MESi, Scene,
Castn) is signiﬁcant. Then the security requirements of the
sensitive system could not be met. Therefore, the encryption
scheme should have the ability to defense some analytical
attacks.
3) The throughput of existing encryption schemes cannot adjust
dynamically (Massoudi et al., 2008). As to video sensing
system, the bandwidth ﬂuctuation of real-time video is sig-
niﬁcant. Hence, the throughputs of the encryption scheme
need to be adjustable.
4) The existing encryption schemes are always connected with
speciﬁc video encoding algorithm, and are lack of universality.
As to our embedded system, video encoding module and video
encryption module work independently. Thus, universal video
encryption scheme will enhance the scalability of system.
4.2. Continuous data stream oriented encryption scheme
Since that in multimedia compression and coding, the
variable-length Huffman coding and other coding processes
remove the redundant information from the original datagram,
statistical character of compressed multimedia data is dramati-
cally different from that of text data. Statistical analysis shows
that coded data has high randomness at the byte level (Qiao and
Nahrstedt, 1997). Based on this statistical character of media
data, we use traditional block cipher to encrypt a block of data,
and use its plaintext as stream cipher key to encrypt the
following l blocks. By changing the parameter l, the speed of
the encryption scheme can be adjusted. The statistical property
of encoded multimedia data makes analytical attacks difﬁcult to
be effective. Therefore, if the attackers cannot break the full
encryption algorithm FE that used in this scheme, they are
unable to get any information from the video. This method
utilizes small resources and acquires a higher security
assurance.
The encryption scheme is shown in Procedure 1. In the
scheme, ﬁrstly, plaintext is divided into blocks with a same
length BlcLength. Secondly, we use a traditional block cipher, full
encryption FE, to encrypt one block. Thirdly, as to the next l
blocks, we use the plaintext of the previous block as its stream
cipher key.
Procedure 2 Package-oriented SAFE scheme
Procedure SAFE
1. Divide plaintext into blocks with a length of BlcLength
Repeat
2. Use FE to encrypt the ﬁrst block in the buffer.
3. For i:¼1 to l do
Let next l block's ciphertext CipherBlcj¼Blcj1Blcj.
Until get the last block.
4. For the last block, encrypt it using FE.
This algorithm is designed for ﬁle data. To avoid the attackers
from guessing the ﬁle header, the ﬁrst n blocks could be full
encrypted, where n could be calculated from the session key. In
addition, although the probability of a block guessed by attackers
is very low, permutation could be used before the division in step
1. Parameter l in step 3 is the speed control parameter. By
controlling the parameter l, the encryption throughput could be
adjusted. And the parameter l can be determined dynamically
according to current data volume in the buffer.
For ﬁle encryption, parameter l should be properly saved either
by saving in a separate ﬁle or saving as an encryption ﬂag EF,
which records whether it have been full encrypted, in the header
of each block. The decryption process can determine the decryp-
tion way according to this ﬂag. If EF is true, the plaintext equals to
FE1(CipherBlcj), else equals to. PlainTextj-1Cipherj.
In the prototype system, we can estimate data volume based on
the video resolution and the target bit rate, and then choose
parameter l. Meanwhile, when the fullness degree of the buffer is
higher than a certain threshold value, encrypted parameter l could
be doubled transiently.
4.3. Packet oriented encryption scheme
The former encryption scheme is designed for encrypting
continuous data and is suitable for multimedia ﬁle encryption.
However, as for wireless transmission module, this scheme cannot
solve the problems of bit error and packet loss. Moreover, data is
packed according to the RTP protocol. Therefore, a packet-based
algorithm can achieve higher efﬁciency. A package-oriented
scheme (POSAFE) is shown in Procedure 2.
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Procedure 1 Basic SAFE scheme
Procedure SAFE
1. Divide plaintext into blocks with a length of BlcLength
Repeat
2. Use FE to encrypt the ﬁrst block in the buffer.
3. For i:¼1 to l do
Let next l block's ciphertext CipherBlcj¼Blcj1Blcj.
Until getting the last block.
4. For the last block, encrypt it using FE.
Because adjacent packets could have different lengths, the XOR
operator in Step 2 is implemented as expression Eq. (7), where
PlainBytei
k is byte k of packet i, CipherByteik is its ciphertext, and PLi
is the length of packet i. In other word, the former packet will be
duplicated at the rear of itself if it is shorter than the current
packet. In addition, the encryption ﬂag of each RTP payload could
be saved in the RTP header.
CipherByteki ¼
PlainByteki  PlainBytek Mod PLi 1i1 PLi4PLi1




4.4. Performance analyses on SAFE
In order to analyze the throughputs of SAFE with different
values of parameter l, simulation program is designed in Cþþ .
The test platform is Intel Core i7 2.1 GHz quad-cores. The full
encryption algorithm FE in the test is DES algorithm with
EBC mode.
Experimental results shown in Table 1. are the throughputs of
SAFE when the CPU has difﬁcult loads. The throughput is mea-
sured in MBps. Row 1 (load 1) gives the result of SAFE without any
other heavy load competitor processes. Row 2 (load 2) gives the
results, where a process with 75 MBps on average disk transmis-
sion is added based on load 1. In row 3 (load 3), another process
which has heavy load is added based on load 1. Besides, l¼0 SAFE
algorithm is equal to full encryption, and l¼1 SAFE is equal to VEA
(Qiao and Nahrstedt, 1997).
Figure 3 shows the increasing trends of the throughput of
encryption scheme SAFE with different loads. When parameter l is
small, the speed of SAFE almost grows linearly. But when l is very
large, limited by the speed of XOR operation, the throughputs of
SAFE converge to 11 GBps and 5.9 GBps respectively.
By comparing the three different load series, we have known
that other computation intensive process in system will compete
computation resources with SAFE and impact the throughput of
SAFE a lot. Contrarily, the I/O intensive process would not impact
the SAFE a lot. Because the main tasks of control module of our
embedded system are data encryption and storing, and the load
factor may not be essential.
We also test the proposed schemes in the embedded prototype
system implemented in Section 5. The result shows that the
throughput of SAFE in that system could achieve approximately
15% of that mentioned in Table 1. If further optimizations on the
software and hardware are accomplished, a better efﬁciency shall
be achieved.
To analyze the theoretical security of SAFE, we considering the
blocks from Blci to Blciþ l in SAFE, based on Shannon theory, the
attack difﬁculty of ciphertext-only attack is H(KP|C), where K is the
key of encryption algorithm F, C is the ciphertext of plaintext P,
Cphri is the corresponding ciphertext of Blci, and H is the condi-
tional entropy function. We get
H KP jCð Þ ¼H KBlciBlciþ1…Blciþ l jCphriCphriþ1…Cphriþ l
 
: ð8Þ
Since the previous block is used as the stream cipher key of the
current block, the security of the current block depends on the
previous one. Finally, security of blocks from Blciþ1 to Blciþ l
depends directly or indirectly on Blci, whose security depends on
the theoretical secrecy of algorithm F. Thus, the ciphertext-only
attack of SAFE has an attack difﬁculty of
H KP jCð Þo ¼H KBlci jCphrið Þ: ð9Þ
Only when adjacent blocks are unrelated with each other, do
we have
H KP jCð Þ ¼H KBlci jCphrið Þ: ð10Þ
Statistical analysis of compressed video stream shows that the
video data has high randomness at the byte level. Thus, the
security of SAFE may be equivalent to the security of the full
encryption FE, which is used to encrypt the Blci.
5. An embedded secure video sensing system
5.1. Structure of embedded system
An embedded video processing system based on DSP and
ARM9 is designed, and the encryption scheme proposed in
Section 4 is implemented. The hardware platform can be divided
into three modules, and the system structure is shown in Fig. 4. It
includes video sensing module, data processing module and
control module.
5.2. Video sensing module
The video sensing module consists of capture module, A/D,
FPGA and FIFO. When control commands are given by CPLD at
Table 1
Throughputs of safe with different parameters and loads.
lþ1 1 2 4 16 64 256 1024 4096
Load 1 56.9 113.4 225.3 846.8 2768.3 6384.3 9476.6 10716.2
Load 2 56.7 112.9 223.3 843.6 2752.1 6351.9 9431.1 10720.0
Load 3 38.0 75.2 148 554.1 1731.5 3691.4 5152.5 5715.9
Fig. 3. The throughput analyses of SAFE.
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runtime, FPGA will parse the command words and process the
captured data according to the user request patterns. Then FPGA
can capture video signals and store them into FIFO in a given
format, and inform data processing module by an interrupt signal.
Then the DSP with EDMA transmit the data periodically into the
buffer in DRAM.
5.3. Sensing data processing module
The data processing module consists of DSP, DRAM and FLASH
memory. TMS320C6455 DSP is used to perform data processing. It
has a frequency of 1 GHz, 2 MB RAM and 8 parallel processing
units. All the intermediate data of reference frames and recon-
structed frames are put into the outer temporary buffer in a
64 MByte DRAM. An 8 MB ﬂash memory is used to save the
bootloader program. In this module, H.264/AVC compression
standard is adopted. At runtime, data processing module can read
video data from the capture module, process them with speciﬁed
H.264/AVC encoder and then transmit them to the control module.
Moreover, the implementation of the encoder is optimized to
achieve real-time processing.
5.4. Control module
The control module is designed based on S3C2410 processor
with the kernel of ARM920T and embedded Linux. In this module,
DRAM and Flash memory are used as the memory, while the CPLD
is used to provide external chip select, and the dual RAM is used to
engage the data transmission between the DSP and ARM, and JTAG
port is used for debugging and testing.
5.5. Implementation and analysis of the encryption schemes
In the control module, H.264 encoded stream is encrypted by
the encryption scheme proposed in Section 4 while the parameter
l used in the prototype system is 64. Then the encrypted video
stream is stored in ﬂash disk. In consideration of the low resolu-
tion of sensing video in prototype system, a ﬁxed parameter l can
meet the requirements of real-time application easily. If multi-
camera with 4 K (4096n2160) high resolution is adopted in the
practical system, a large parameter l could be selected and be
adjusted by the method mentioned before. In the functions of
wireless transmission, the control module sends the snapshot
video produced by the data processing module to remote control
unit through wireless channel. Snapshot data is packaged using
RTP protocol. And the RTP payload is encrypted using POSAFE
proposed in Section 4.3.
The typical resolution ratio we implemented in the prototype
system is 1280n720@25fps while the target bit rate is 5 Mbps.
According to the results in Section 4.4, if the parameter l in SAFE is
set to 64, the throughput of the scheme would be greater than
200 Mbps. And the computation resources occupation rate of the
encryption process is about 2%, which would not be a signiﬁcant
overhead for the control module.
Thereby, even several 4 K high-deﬁnition sensing equipments
are introduced, the problem of real-time encryption also can be
solved by adjusting the parameter l of SAFE.
6. Conclusions
Real-time video data in embedded video sensing system has a
high bandwidth. However, as to battery- powered system, limited
computation and energy resources restrict the usage of full
encryption process on video data. Firstly, this research analyses
the discrepancy between encryption resources and volume of real-
time data, and then draws a conclusion that the discrepancy
would not converge because the increase of encryption ability is
difﬁcult to catch up with the increase of data volume. Secondly, to
get a better optimization for encryption scheme, impacts of
encryption optimization on attacker's behavior are discussed.
And then, information-utility-value-oriented encryption optimiza-
tion model for multimedia data under resources constraints is
proposed. Such model can optimize the distribution of limited
resources, then minimize the probable information utility value
which could be stolen by attacker. Thirdly, based on aforemen-
tioned model a video-compression-independent speed-adjustable
fast encryption scheme and a packet-oriented improved version
are proposed. Fourthly, an embedded video sensing system has
been designed, and the proposed encryption schemes have been
implemented in data storing and transmission module respec-
tively. Theoretical analyses based on information theory and
experimental analyses indicate that the performance of the
proposed scheme is effective enough to support the encryption
of real-time data in embedded video sensing systems.
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